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FEDERAL PLEADING AND STATE PRESUIT DISCOVERY
by
*
Scott Dodson
This Article explores the role that state presuit discovery could play in
rectifying the information imbalance caused by Twombly and Iqbal—
when a plaintiff in federal court requires information in the hands (or
minds) of defendants or third parties in order to properly plead her claim,
but such information is not discoverable unless the claim can survive a
motion to dismiss. First, this Article provides an account of the
development of federal pleading standards from before Twombly
through their current post-Iqbal state. Second, this Article describes the
effects of the post-Iqbal federal pleading standards and highlights the
harsh results that they can have when the plaintiff is confronted with
information asymmetry. Third, this Article describes various state law
presuit discovery tools that are available to be used by plaintiffs who fear
dismissal under the federal pleading standards. It then considers whether
they can be an effective tool for avoiding dismissal, in light of both their
utility and their limitations. Finally, this Article argues that both the
availability and limitations of state presuit discovery options support
amending the federal rules to provide for federal presuit discovery.
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INTRODUCTION

It is an exciting time to be a federal civil rules buff. Historically,
blockbuster opinions involving the civil rules have been few and far
between. But the last two years have been an exception. Bell Atlantic Corp.
1
2
v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal together have transformed federal civil
3
pleading from a seventy-year pleading regime based primarily on notice
to a newly-minted “plausibility” regime based primarily on nonconclusory facts.
That transformation implicates high stakes for plaintiffs proceeding
with claims that depend upon facts exclusively in the hands (or minds) of
defendants and third parties. The plaintiff may need those facts to plead
her claim properly under Twombly and Iqbal, but she may not be able to
discover those facts unless she can survive a motion to dismiss.
Commentators have begun to explore ways out of this catch-22. One
4
of the most obvious is to abrogate or limit Twombly and Iqbal. Others

1

127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007).
129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
3
Some might say “fifty-year regime.” See Emily Sherwin, The Story of Conley:
Precedent by Accident, in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES 295, 317–18 (Kevin M. Clermont ed.,
2d ed. 2008) (arguing that the original rules were stricter than Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41 (1957), interpreted them to be); Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered
Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L.
REV. 909, 985, 992–94 (1987) (same).
4
By my count, no less than seven such proposals have been offered in writing
since Iqbal. See Open Access to Courts Act of 2009, H.R. 4115, 111th Cong. § 2(a)
(2009) (“A court shall not dismiss a complaint under [Rule 12] unless it appears
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim which
would entitled the plaintiff to relief. A court shall not dismiss a complaint . . . on the
basis of a determination by the judge that the factual contents of the complaint do
not show the plaintiff’s claim to be plausible . . . .”); Notice Pleading Restoration Act
of 2009, S. 1504, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009) (“Except as otherwise expressly provided by
an Act of Congress or by an amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
which takes effect after the date of enactment of this Act, a Federal court shall not
dismiss a complaint under rule 12(b)(6) or (e) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, except under the standards set forth by the Supreme Court of the United
States in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).”); Has the Supreme Court Limited
Americans’ Access to Courts?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong.
(2009) (prepared statement of Stephen B. Burbank), available at http://judiciary.
senate.gov/pdf/12-02-09%20Burbank%20Testimony.pdf (“[T]he law governing (a)
dismissal or striking of all or any part of a pleading containing a claim or defense for
failure to state a claim, indefiniteness, or insufficiency and (b) judgment on the
pleadings, shall be in accordance with interpretations of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure by the Supreme Court of the United States, and by lower courts in
decisions consistent with such interpretations, that existed on May 20, 2007.”); Kevin
M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 IOWA L.
REV. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 50), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1448796 (suggesting Rule 8(a) should be amended in this way: “a short and plain
statement of the claim—regardless of its nonconclusory plausibility—showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief”); Posting of Michael C. Dorf to Dorf on Law, An
Alternative to Senator Specter’s Notice Pleading Bill, http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2009/07/
2
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have suggested tinkering with federal discovery rules or practices to
5
ameliorate the harsh results of plausibility pleading. Those possibilities
are promising, but they also run up against the time-consuming,
cumbersome, and politically uncertain task of revising the federal rules
6
or statutorily overturning them.
But a less obvious way out may already exist: using presuit discovery
to gather the facts needed to survive a motion to dismiss based on
Twombly and Iqbal. Federal presuit discovery is of little help here: Rule 27
7
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows for presuit discovery only
to perpetuate testimony, not to discover new facts needed to survive a
8
motion to dismiss. But many state rules permit presuit discovery, and
several do so for the express purpose of drafting a sufficient complaint.
Although these rules likely were not designed for this purpose, plaintiffs
could use these state procedures in state court to obtain the information

alternative-to-senator-specters-notice_28.html (July 29, 2009, 3:13 AM) (“Except as
otherwise expressly provided by an Act of Congress or by an amendment to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which takes effect after the date of enactment of this
Act, a Federal court shall not deem a pleading inadequate under rule 8(a)(2) or rule
8(b)(1)(A) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on the ground that such pleading
is conclusory or implausible, except that a court may take judicial notice of the
implausibility of a factual allegation. So long as the pleaded claim or defense provides
fair notice of the nature of the claim or defense, and the allegations, if taken to be
true, would support a legally sufficient claim or defense, a pleading satisfies the
requirements of rule 8.”); Posting of David Shapiro, dshapiro@law.harvard.edu, to
Civil Procedure Listserv, civ-pro@listserv.nd.edu (July 7, 2009) (on file with author)
(“Except as otherwise expressly provided by statute or in these rules, an allegation of
fact, or of the application of law to fact, shall [must?] not be held insufficient on the
grounds that it is conclusory and/or implausible, unless the rules governing judicial
notice require a determination that the allegation is not credible.”); Posting of Art
Wolf, awolf@law.wnec.edu, to Civil Procedure Listserv, civ-pro@listserv.nd.edu (Oct.
20, 2009) (on file with author) (proposing amending Rule 8(a)(2) to read “a short
and plain statement giving [sufficient] notice of the claim upon which relief can be
granted” or “a short and plain statement of the claim upon which relief can be
granted so that a party can [may] reasonably prepare a response” (alterations in
original)); cf. Posting of Jonathan Siegel, jsiegel@law.gwu.edu, to Civil Procedure
Listserv, civ-pro@listserv.nd.edu (Oct. 20, 2009) (on file with author) (favoring the
promulgation of new Federal Forms to abrogate Twombly and Iqbal, and proposing
examples). No doubt others are percolating. See Lonny S. Hoffman, Burn Up the Chaff
with Unquenchable Fire: What Two Doctrinal Intersections Can Teach Us About Judicial Power
over Pleadings, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1217, 1223–24 (2008) (suggesting that the Rules
Advisory Committee considered options for overturning the effect of Twombly).
5
See, e.g., A. Benjamin Spencer, Understanding Pleading Doctrine, 108 MICH. L. REV.
1 (2009) (suggesting such proposals).
6
See Tony Mauro, Plaintiffs Groups Mount Effort to Undo Supreme Court’s ‘Iqbal’
Ruling, LAW.COM, Sept. 21, 2009, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=120243
3931370 (reporting that the chair of the rules committee intends to be cautious
about rule amendments to soften Iqbal).
7
FED. R. CIV. P. 27.
8
See Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman, Access to Information, Access to Justice: The Role of
Presuit Investigatory Discovery, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 217, 226–27 (2007).
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necessary to file a complaint that ultimately would be subject to federal
pleading standards.
This Article explores the role that state presuit discovery could play
in rectifying the information imbalance caused by Twombly and Iqbal. Part
II of this Article provides an account of the development of federal
pleading standards from before Twombly through their current post-Iqbal
state. Part III describes the effects of the post-Iqbal federal pleading
standards and highlights the harsh results that they can have when the
plaintiff is confronted with information asymmetry.
Part IV then describes various state law presuit discovery tools that
are available to be used by plaintiffs who fear dismissal under the federal
pleading standards. It then considers whether they can be an effective
tool for avoiding dismissal, in light of both their utility and their
limitations. Two points bear clarification here. The first is that I mean to
focus on the role state presuit discovery can play in state courts to obtain
information that then will enable the plaintiff to avoid dismissal in
federal court. Thus, I do not intend to delve into the murky waters of
whether federal courts could (or must) implement state presuit discovery
9
rules under Erie. The second is that most state presuit discovery really is
presuit; thus, the presuit discovery mechanisms can be implemented
before any substantive claims are filed in a complaint. As I will explain
below, that feature makes removal of presuit discovery difficult, if not
impossible.
Part V concludes by suggesting that both the availability and
limitations of state presuit discovery options support amending the
federal rules to provide for federal presuit discovery.
II. PLEADINGS DEVELOPMENT THROUGH IQBAL
A. Pre-Twombly Law
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the principal
pleadings rule, was adopted in 1938 and replaced a code pleading regime
that differed substantially from its successor. The code required the
complaint to contain “[a] statement of the facts constituting the cause of
10
11
action.” Rule 8, by contrast, is conspicuously silent on fact pleading,
instead requiring only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing
12
that the pleader is entitled to relief.”

9
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). For more on that thorny issue,
see infra note 74 and accompanying text.
10
Act of Apr. 12, 1848, ch. 379, § 120(2), 1848 N.Y. Laws 497, 521; see also 5
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1216, at 207 (3d ed. 2004) (describing the fact pleading required by the codes).
11
See 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 10, § 1216, at 207 (“Conspicuously absent
from Federal Rule 8(a)(2) is the requirement found in the codes that the pleader set
forth the ‘facts’ constituting a ‘cause of action.’”).
12
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).

Do Not Delete

2010]

2/11/2010 8:04 PM

FEDERAL PLEADING & PRESUIT DISCOVERY

47

The drafters of Rule 8 intentionally devised a pleading regime more
13
lenient than that of the codes. They wished to reduce the importance of
14
pleadings and their technicalities. Indeed, Charles Clark, the principal
draftsman of Rule 8, initially favored eliminating special pleadings
altogether and argued for a standard requiring a concise statement of
15
only pertinent facts with little legal recitation. Although that was not to
be, Rule 8 implemented a pleading regime less concerned about facts
16
and more concerned with providing notice. As the Seventh Circuit once
put it, “a judicial order dismissing a complaint because the plaintiff did
17
not plead facts [under Rule 8] has a short half-life.”
Nevertheless, the lower courts largely resisted this liberal pleading
18
standard until 1957, when the Supreme Court, in Conley v. Gibson,
declared that Rule 8 does “not require a claimant to set out in detail the
facts upon which he bases his claim,” but instead requires only
19
“simplified ‘notice pleading.’” Although lower courts continued to
20
attempt to impose heightened pleading in a variety of contexts, the
Court continued, often unanimously, to strike those attempts down and
21
to adhere to the liberal notice pleading standard of Conley. At least, that
was the case until 2007.
13

See Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 433 (1986).
14
See Richard L. Marcus, The Puzzling Persistence of Pleading Practice, 76 TEX. L. REV.
1749, 1749 (1998).
15
See Michael E. Smith, Judge Charles E. Clark and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
85 YALE L.J. 914, 923–28 (1976).
16
See Scott Dodson, Comparative Convergences in Pleading Standards, 158 U. PA. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1351994 (describing
this contrast); see also Thomson v. Washington, 362 F.3d 969, 970 (7th Cir. 2004)
(Posner, J.) (“The federal rules replaced fact pleading with notice pleading.”).
17
Vincent v. City Colls. of Chi., 485 F.3d 919, 923 (7th Cir. 2007); see also Kolupa
v. Roselle Park Dist., 438 F.3d 713, 715 (7th Cir. 2006) (“Any decision declaring ‘this
complaint is deficient because it does not allege X’ is a candidate for summary
reversal . . . .”).
18
See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., From Whom No Secrets Are Hid, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1665,
1685 (1998); Marcus, supra note 13, at 433.
19
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47–48 (1957); see also Spencer, supra note 5, at 5
(arguing that Conley endorsed a notice pleading regime under Rule 8); Clermont &
Yeazell, supra note 4 (manuscript at 5) (“Under the Rules, then, pleading was a
pervious gate. Its main task was to give fair notice of the pleader’s contentions to the
adversary (and the court and the public).”). But see Sherwin, supra note 3, at 317–18
(arguing that the original rules were stricter than Conley interpreted them to be);
Subrin, supra note 3, at 985, 992–94.
20
See Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TEX. L. REV. 551, 551
(2002) (“Despite this clarity [of Rule 8] and the Supreme Court’s endorsement of
notice pleading in Conley v. Gibson, federal courts have embraced heightened
pleading burdens in a variety of situations.”).
21
See, e.g., Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination
Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508
(2002); see also Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L. REV.
987, 997 (2003) (“[W]hen called upon to address pleading issues square on, the
Court continually—and unanimously—embrace[d] simplified notice pleading.”).
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B. Twombly
22

In 2007, the Supreme Court decided Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
23
and turned the civil procedure world on its head. Twombly involved an
antitrust conspiracy class action complaint alleging conscious parallel
24
conduct among telecommunications providers. Conscious parallel
conduct alone does not prove a conspiracy under substantive antitrust
25
law. But the Supreme Court had never imposed that evidentiary
standard at the pleadings stage before.
Twombly did just that. The Court held that plaintiffs seeking to avoid
dismissal of their complaint must plead “plausible grounds” for inferring
a conspiracy, and that allegations of conscious parallel conduct alone
26
would not suffice.
Twombly created widespread uncertainty among lower courts and
27
commentators. The Court did not explain whether its holding was trans28
29
substantive or not, such as being limited to costly litigations or

22

127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007).
See Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 4 (manuscript at 2) (“The headline need no
longer equivocate . . . . The U.S. Supreme Court has revolutionized the law on
pleading.”); Dodson, supra note 16 (manuscript at 3) (calling the case “dramatic[]”);
Scott Dodson, Pleading Standards After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 93 VA. L. REV. IN
BRIEF 135, 135 (2007), http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2007/07/09/
dodson.pdf (arguing that the Court “gutted the venerable language from Conley v.
Gibson that every civil procedure professor and student can recite almost by heart”).
24
Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1961–62.
25
Id. at 1964.
26
Id. at 1964–66, 1966 n.5. What is required under Rule 8 and what is needed to
survive dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) are not necessarily the same, and it does not
appear that the Supreme Court, in either Conley or Twombly, has given much thought
to those distinctions. I leave deeper exploration of those issues for another day.
27
See, e.g., Dodson, supra note 16 (manuscript at 19) (“Twombly raised a stir after
it was decided, resulting in mass confusion about its scope and meaning.”); Dodson,
supra note 23, at 141–42 (documenting the uncertainties remaining after Twombly);
Colleen McMahon, The Law of Unintended Consequences: Shockwaves in the Lower Courts
After Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 851, 853 (2008) (“We district
court judges suddenly and unexpectedly find ourselves puzzled over something we
thought we knew how to do with our eyes closed: dispose of a motion to dismiss a case
for failure to state a claim.”); Posting of Scott Dodson to PrawfsBlawg, The Mystery of
Twombly
Continues,
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2008/02/themystery-of.html (Feb. 5, 2008, 11:40 PM) (describing circuit confusion).
28
See, e.g., Dodson, supra note 23, at 140 (arguing that “the best reading of Bell
Atlantic is that Rule 8 now requires notice-plus pleading for all cases”).
29
See Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1967 (“It is no answer to say that a claim just shy of a
plausible entitlement to relief can, if groundless, be weeded out early in the discovery
process through ‘careful case management,’ . . . given the common lament that the
success of judicial supervision in checking discovery abuse has been on the modest
side. . . . [T]he threat of discovery expense will push cost-conscious defendants to
settle even anemic cases.”); Douglas G. Smith, The Twombly Revolution?, 36 PEPP. L.
REV. 1063, 1083–85 (2009) (suggesting that Twombly applied only to complex, highdiscovery-cost cases).
23
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30

antitrust conspiracy claims. Nor did the Court explain what its new
31
“plausibility” test was or how it might be applied in different cases. Some
32
even wondered whether Twombly was significant as a pleadings case. Just
about the only thing that was clear from Twombly was that it would take
another pronouncement from the Court to answer these questions.
C. Iqbal
That pronouncement came on May 18, 2009, when the Court
33
decided Ashcroft v. Iqbal. There, an executive detainee sued John
Ashcroft, the former U.S. Attorney General, and Robert Mueller, the FBI
Director, alleging that they adopted a policy of discrimination on the
basis of race, religion, and national origin in the aftermath of September
34
11th. The defendants asserted a qualified immunity defense and argued
that Iqbal had failed to plead a “plausible” showing of entitlement to
35
relief under Twombly.
The Supreme Court agreed. In the process, it confirmed that
36
Twombly’s plausibility standard for Rule 8 pleading was a new factual

30
See, e.g., Allan Ides, Bell Atlantic and the Principle of Substantive Sufficiency Under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2): Toward a Structured Approach to Federal Pleading
Practice, 243 F.R.D. 604, 635–36 (2007) (“[T]he ‘better’ reading of Bell Atlantic is that
it did not change the law of pleading, but that it simply applied long-accepted
pleading standards to a unique body of law under which the plaintiffs’ complaint
failed to include any facts or plausible inferences supportive of a material element of
the claim specifically asserted by the plaintiffs.”).
31
Compare Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1973 n.14 (“[W]e do not apply any ‘heightened’
pleading standard, nor do we seek to broaden the scope of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 9.”), and id. at 1974 (“Here, . . . we do not require heightened fact
pleading of specifics . . . .”), with Posting of Michael C. Dorf to Dorf on Law, The End
of Notice Pleading?, http://michaeldorf.org/2007/05/end-of-notice-pleading.html
(May 24, 2007, 7:35 AM) (asserting that Twombly imposes a heightened pleading
standard), and A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 475
(2008) (arguing that Twombly imposes “a pleading obligation that approaches the
particularity requirement of Rule 9(b)”), and with Dodson, supra note 23, at 140
(“What Rule 8 requires after both Erickson and Bell Atlantic are not specific facts, but
sufficient facts such that the complaint as a whole makes a ‘showing’ of entitlement to
relief.”), and Dodson, supra note 16 (manuscript at 22) (arguing that Twombly shifted
the pleadings emphasis from one of notice to one of facts).
32
See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court
Access, 94 IOWA L. REV. 873, 877 (2009) (arguing that Twombly’s import is modest);
Posting of Einer Elhauge to The Volokh Conspiracy, Twombly—The New Supreme
Court Antitrust Conspiracy Case, http://volokh.com/2007/05/21/twombly-the-newsupreme-court-antitrust-conspiracy-case (May 21, 2007, 6:15 PM) (calling the decision
“quite insignificant”). But see Dodson, supra note 23, at 137 (“Bell Atlantic is a
significant statement from the Court from a proceduralist perspective.”).
33
129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
34
Id. at 1942.
35
Id.; Brief for the Petitioners at 12–13, Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (No. 07-1015).
36
Compare Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (“Where a complaint pleads facts that are
‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between
possibility and plausibility of “entitlement to relief.”’” (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
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sufficiency standard that operates independent of the notice
37
requirement, and that the plausibility standard was trans-substantive,
spanning all Rule 8 cases regardless of the cause of action or the
38
anticipated cost of discovery.
In addition, the Court imposed a new pleadings dichotomy between
conclusory and non-conclusory factual allegations. Iqbal alleged that the
defendants “‘knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to
subject [him]’ to harsh conditions of confinement ‘as a matter of policy,
solely on account of [his] religion, race, and/or national origin and for
39
no legitimate penological interest.’” He also alleged that the defendants
were “instrumental” and the “principal architect” of the discriminatory
40
policies.
The Court disregarded these allegations as conclusory and
41
unsupported by additional factual allegations. The Court stated: “Rule 8
marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, codepleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of
42
discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.”
Accordingly, the Court refused to credit those allegations and instead
assessed the plausibility of the complaint without them. Under that
standard, “respondent’s complaint does not contain any factual
allegation sufficient to plausibly suggest petitioners’ discriminatory state

Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1966 (2007))), with Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236
(1974) (“[I]t is well established that, in passing on a motion to dismiss, . . . the
allegations of the complaint should be construed favorably to the pleader.”), and 5B
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 10, § 1357, at 417 (“A proposition that is at the heart of
the application of the Rule 12(b)(6) motion, and one that is of universal
acceptance . . . is that for purposes of the motion to dismiss . . . all reasonable
inferences that can be drawn from the pleading are drawn in favor of the pleader.”);
see also Posting of Scott Dodson to Civil Procedure & Federal Courts Blog, Beyond
Twombly, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/civpro/2009/05/beyond-twombly-byprof-scott-dodson.html (May 18, 2009) (“I think it is fair to say that we have entered a
new era in pleadings. Notice is now an aside, probably insignificant in most cases.
Instead, pleadings litigation will focus on factual sufficiency.”).
37
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (stating that Twombly required “sufficient factual
matter” to state a plausible claim); see also Dodson, supra note 16 (manuscript at 24)
(collecting additional cites from Iqbal).
38
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953 (“Our decision in Twombly expounded the pleading
standard for ‘all civil actions,’ . . . and it applies to antitrust and discrimination suits
alike.”); id. at 1953–54 (“We decline respondent’s invitation to relax the pleading
requirements on the ground that the Court of Appeals promises petitioners
minimally intrusive discovery.”); see also Dodson, supra note 36 (“Twombly’s
‘plausibility’ standard is clearly now a uniform Rule 8 standard, not a standard borne
of antitrust law or reserved for certain claims, as some had argued.”).
39
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951 (quoting First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand
at ¶ 96, Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 04 CV 1809 (JG)(JA), 2005 WL 2375202
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005)).
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id. at 1950.
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of mind. His pleadings thus do not meet the standard necessary to
43
comply with Rule 8.”
Taken together, Twombly and Iqbal are having a transformative
impact on pleading. In August 2009, for example, a district court
dismissed a garden-variety slip-and-fall negligence case under the new
44
standard because of the plaintiff’s failure to plead certain facts. The
plaintiff pleaded that there was liquid on the floor and that the
defendant negligently failed to remove the liquid or warn her of its
45
presence. The district court, incorporating evidentiary standards of
proof into the pleading burden, dismissed the complaint because,
the Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts that show how the liquid
came to be on the floor, whether the Defendant knew or should
have known of the presence of the liquid, or how the Plaintiff’s
accident occurred. . . . While consistent with the possibility of the
Defendant’s liability, the Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations that the
Defendant was negligent . . . are insufficient to state a plausible
46
claim for relief.
47

That is a far cry from notice pleading pre-Twombly.

III. PLAUSIBILITY PLEADING EFFECTS
As I have argued elsewhere, Twombly and Iqbal impose a fact pleading
48
requirement on Rule 8. The plausibility standard of Twombly assesses the
factual sufficiency of the allegations. And, the conclusory/non-conclusory
dichotomy of Iqbal forces a plaintiff to detail factual support for her
allegations to avoid having them be deemed “conclusory” and thus
disregarded. As Professors Kevin Clermont and Stephen Yeazell have
recently argued, “[A]s to factual sufficiency, the plaintiff practically must
plead facts and even some evidence. The plaintiff should give a
particularized mention of the factual circumstances of each element of
49
the claim.” Thus, the Twombly-Iqbal standard focuses motions to dismiss
on factual detail, resulting in some cases being dismissed that would not
50
have been under pre-Twombly standards.
Dismissing at an early stage cases that lack merit has its benefits.
Such dismissals will conserve judicial resources for those claims that do

43

Id. at 1952.
Branham v. Dolgencorp, Inc., Civil No. 6:09-CV-00037, 2009 WL 2604447, at *3
(W.D. Va. Aug. 24, 2009) (mem.).
45
Id. at *1.
46
Id. at *2.
47
Professor Robert Bone has argued that Iqbal represents a far cry from the
pleading standards even of Twombly. See Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited
and Revised: A Comment on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming
2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1467799.
48
See Dodson, supra note 16 (manuscript at 25); Dodson, supra note 23, at 138.
49
Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 4 (manuscript at 11).
50
Dodson, supra note 23, at 142.
44
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have merit and will save both plaintiffs and defendants the time and
money they would otherwise spend litigating meritless cases. The
question is whether the Twombly-Iqbal pleading standard is an appropriate
proxy for meritlessness.
In some cases, the inability or refusal of a plaintiff to plead sufficient
non-conclusory facts under Twombly and Iqbal might indeed suggest that
the plaintiff’s claims are meritless. After all, plaintiffs have resources—
such as public information, informal investigation, state inspection
51
52
statutes, and the Freedom of Information Act —to get certain facts
prior to filing a complaint. If the facts necessary to survive a motion to
dismiss ought to be available to the plaintiff through these means, and
the plaintiff does not plead them, then it may be reasonable to infer that
the failure to plead those facts with plausibility means that those facts do
not exist, and that the plaintiff will be unable to prove her claim without
53
them.
54
But that inference is not always reasonable. Some facts may be
solely in the hands of the defendants or hostile third parties. Certain
claims, especially those hinging on the defendant’s state of mind or
secretive conduct, are particularly susceptible to that kind of
55
“information asymmetry.” Civil rights and discrimination claims,
corporate wrongdoing, unlawful conspiracies, and intentional torts are
56
all good examples.
51

See generally Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, Using State Inspection
Statutes for Discovery in Federal Securities Fraud Actions, 77 B.U. L. REV. 69 (1997).
52
5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2006).
53
Of course, other reasons might cause such a pleading. Uncovering the
necessary facts through non-discovery means might be cost-prohibitive, or the party
or her attorney may simply have overlooked an opportunity for obtaining the
information.
54
See Posting of Scott Dodson to Civil Procedure & Federal Courts Blog, Against
Twombly & Iqbal—A Reply to Drug & Device Law Post, http://lawprofessors.
typepad.com/civpro/2009/06/response-to-drug-device-law-post.html (June 5, 2009)
(“The failure to plead a plausible claim is not necessarily an indication that the claim
lacks merit.”). The opinion in Twombly assumes the opposite. See Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1967 (2007) (“[I]t is only by taking care to require
allegations that reach the level suggesting conspiracy that we can hope to avoid the
potentially enormous expense of discovery in cases with no ‘reasonably founded hope
that the [discovery] process will reveal relevant evidence’ to support a § 1 claim.”
(quoting Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005))).
55
Robert G. Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 519, 542 (1997)
(using the term “asymmetric information”); Posting of Randal Picker to The
University of Chicago Law School Faculty Blog, Closing the Doors to (Antitrust)
Plaintiffs?, (May 21, 2007, 4:45 PM), http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2007/
05/closing_the_doo.html (using the term).
56
See Dodson, supra note 54 (“In those cases, the information often necessary to
meet the plausibility standard is largely in the hands of the defendants.”); Kendall W.
Hannon, Note, Much Ado About Twombly? A Study on the Impact of Bell Atlantic v.
Twombly on 12(b)(6) Motions, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1811, 1815 (2008) (concluding
that dismissal rates rose in civil rights cases after Twombly); Lonny Hoffman, Using
Presuit Discovery to Overcome Barriers to the Courthouse, 34 LITIG. 31, 32 (2008)
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The fortunate plaintiff may find external evidence that creates a
legally permissible inference of the defendant’s state of mind in such
57
cases, but not all plaintiffs will be so fortunate. Less fortunate plaintiffs
may require formal discovery to obtain those facts. Though they may
actually have suffered cognizable harm, these plaintiffs cannot survive a
motion to dismiss without formal discovery and cannot access formal
58
discovery without surviving a motion to dismiss. In such cases, the
plausibility standard imposes a significant cost—the dismissal of
59
meritorious claims through no fault of the plaintiff.
IV. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
Therein lies the catch-22: a plaintiff may have a meritorious claim,
but, because critical facts are solely within the possession of the
defendant, she cannot plead her claims with sufficient factual detail to
survive a motion to dismiss under Twombly and Iqbal. If only she could get

(mentioning these cases); Joseph A. Seiner, The Trouble with Twombly: A Proposed
Pleading Standard for Employment Discrimination Cases, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1011, 1014
(“[T]he lower courts are unquestionably using the new plausibility standard to
dismiss Title VII claims.”); see also Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape of
Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: The Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and Employment
Discrimination Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (discussing the impact of
plausibility pleading on civil rights and discrimination claims); Carl Tobias, Rule 11
and Civil Rights Litigation, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 485, 498 (1989) (noting that civil rights
plaintiffs “rarely will possess or be able to obtain information pertinent to their
cases . . . available only during discovery”).
57
See, e.g., Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1965 n.4 (describing facts that would give rise to
an inference of an antitrust conspiracy); Richard A. Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly:
How Motions to Dismiss Become (Disguised) Summary Judgments, 25 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y
61 (2007) (discussing publicly available information supporting an inference of
conspiracy); Geoffrey P. Miller, Pleading After Tellabs, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 507 (2009)
(discussing publicly available information supporting an inference of scienter in
securities fraud).
58
Professor Edward Hartnett argues that district courts have the power to permit
discovery pending a decision on a motion to dismiss. See Edward Hartnett, Taming
Twombly, 158 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1452875. I discuss this possibility in greater depth below.
59
Dodson, supra note 36 (predicting that plausibility pleading “will surely result
in fewer meritorious cases filed, more meritorious cases dismissed, and less unlawful
conduct redressed”); Dodson, supra note 54 (“[E]rroneously equating the failure to
plead plausibility with meritlessness will result in fewer meritorious cases filed, fewer
meritorious cases surviving to discovery, and fewer injuries resulting from wrongful
conduct being redressed.”); Dodson, supra note 23, at 138–39 (“Safeguarding
defendants from meritless strike suits is all fine and good. But using fact pleading
standards to do so is problematic. Antitrust plaintiffs often do not possess evidence of
an agreement to conspire, and requiring such evidence prior to discovery may
prevent them from ever having it. It may be that Twombly did not allege more facts
because he simply did not have them yet, not because they did not exist . . . . [T]he
Court’s standard is likely to bar many antitrust cases (and mass tort, discrimination,
and a host of other cases) with merit.”).
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some discovery, she might be able to obtain the facts that she needs. But
how can she obtain that discovery without surviving a motion to dismiss?
A. Some Unlikely Federal Options
There are a few federal options for rectifying this problem, but none
of them is particularly promising.
First, Rule 27 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows
60
for presuit discovery only to perpetuate testimony, is unavailing. Courts
are nearly uniform in holding that it does not authorize discovery for the
61
purpose of obtaining new facts needed to survive a motion to dismiss.
Some have urged, notwithstanding the limitations of Rule 27, the
adoption of a federal mechanism for allowing presuit or pre-dismissal
62
discovery. But the civil rulemaking process is cumbersome and any rule
proposal must win the approval of the Supreme Court, the very body that
imposed the plausibility pleading requirement in the first place.
Second, the plaintiff could sue a defendant against whom she has a
plausible claim and then, during discovery in that case, seek to elicit facts
that would enable her to plead a plausible claim against a second
defendant against whom she otherwise would not have been able to
plead a plausible claim. This scenario has promise but only would be
available to plaintiffs who have plausible claims against the persons who
have the information the plaintiff needs to assert against the prospective
defendant.
Third, Professor Edward Hartnett has argued that discovery can
63
proceed during the pendency of a motion to dismiss. If discovery is
allowed pending the motion to dismiss, plaintiffs may obtain the
information they need to survive Twombly and Iqbal in an amended
64
complaint. Discovery, he argues, could be narrowly tailored to the
65
particular allegation at issue.
I am convinced that Professor Hartnett is correct that the rules do
66
not automatically stay discovery upon the filing of a motion to dismiss
60

FED. R. CIV. P. 27.
See Hoffman, supra note 8, at 226–27.
62
See, e.g., Bone, supra note 32, at 910–35 (sketching out such a system);
Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 4 (manuscript at 46–47) (The “civil rulemakers might
require as the price of admission to discovery—imposed if the opposing party has
successfully moved under Twombly-Iqbal against the claim—that the claimant
demonstrate something like probable cause to believe that discovery would yield
significant pertinent evidence.”); Spencer, supra note 5, at 29–30.
63
Hartnett, supra note 58 (manuscript at 44). Professor Suzette Malveaux has
made a similar argument. See Suzette M. Malveaux, Front Loading and Heavy Lifting:
How Pre-Dismissal Discovery Can Address the Detrimental Effect of Iqbal on Civil Rights Cases,
14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 65 (2010) (arguing for targeted, pre-merits discovery under
Rule 26 to resolve threshold plausibility issues).
64
Hartnett, supra note 58 (manuscript at 46–47).
65
Id. (manuscript at 47).
66
Id. (manuscript at 44). As he points out, Rule 26(c) allows district courts to stay
discovery for good cause. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c).
61
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67

(except in specific statutory contexts ) and that a district court has
discretion to allow discovery to proceed during the pendency of such a
motion. Indeed, it appears that some courts pre-Twombly have allowed
68
discovery even after dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim. As
a related possibility, federal courts may attempt (and have done so
occasionally in the past) to allow discovery outside of the context of the
69
federal rules under an inherent equitable power.
But language in Twombly and Iqbal surely will give defendants
ammunition with which to argue against such discovery, and that same
language will give district courts great pause before allowing pre- or postdismissal discovery or discovery authority outside of the context of the
federal rules. It was, after all, the very threat of discovery costs and the
perceived inability of district courts to control it that motivated the Court
to impose the stricter pleading standard in the first place. Twombly, for
example, spares no words on that score:
It is no answer to say that a claim just shy of a plausible entitlement
to relief can, if groundless, be weeded out early in the discovery
process through “careful case management” given the common
lament that the success of judicial supervision in checking discovery
abuse has been on the modest side. . . . [T]he threat of discovery
expense will push cost-conscious defendants to settle even anemic
cases before reaching those proceedings. Probably, then, it is only
by taking care to require allegations that reach the level suggesting
conspiracy that we can hope to avoid the[se] potentially enormous
70
expense[s] of discovery . . . .
Iqbal was even more emphatic: “Rule 8 marks a notable and generous
departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era,
but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with
71
nothing more than conclusions.” And again: “We decline respondent’s
invitation to relax the pleading requirements on the ground that the
Court of Appeals promises petitioners minimally intrusive discovery. . . .
Because respondent’s complaint is deficient under Rule 8, he is not
72
entitled to discovery, cabined or otherwise.”
The import of Twombly and Iqbal is that only a complaint that can
survive a motion to dismiss entitles a plaintiff to discovery from the
defendant or third parties. In order to take advantage of Professor

67

Securities fraud is a notable example. See 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(b)(1) (2006).
See, e.g., Cordero-Hernández v. Hernández-Ballesteros, 449 F.3d 240, 244 (1st
Cir. 2006); New England Data Servs., Inc. v. Becher, 829 F.2d 286, 290 (1st Cir. 1987);
Reints v. Sheppard, 90 F.R.D. 346, 347 (M.D. Pa. 1981).
69
Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of Am. v. Energy Gathering, Inc., 2 F.3d 1397, 1406
(5th Cir. 1993).
70
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1967 (2007); see also id. at 1967 n.6
(“Given the system that we have, the hope of effective judicial supervision is
slim . . . .”).
71
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009).
72
Id. at 1953–54.
68
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Hartnett’s solution, a plaintiff would have to file a factually insufficient
pleading on the hope that the district judge allows discovery to proceed
during the pendency of a motion to dismiss and in the face of the
Supreme Court’s statements in Twombly and Iqbal justifying stricter
pleading standards as a way to control discovery. That strikes me as a
risky, costly, and altogether unlikely course of action.
B. Using State Law
But that is in federal court. Parallel state court systems are generally
available and can operate simultaneously. Might they provide ways out
for plaintiffs trapped in federal court by this information asymmetry?
For plaintiffs able to file their claims in states that retain a notice
pleading standard more forgiving than the Twombly-Iqbal standard, the
answer may be yes, but only in insignificant ways for my purposes. To be
sure, plaintiffs suing non-diverse defendants for state causes of action
must choose this route because federal court is unavailable. But these
plaintiffs never had to fear the federal standard at all. It is therefore more
revealing to ask whether filing a removable claim in state court under a
forgiving pleading standard would be a useful option.
Here, I think the answer is probably not. Most federal claims do not
73
come with a statutory pleading standard attached to them, meaning that
a state court hearing a federal cause of action probably would apply a
more liberal state pleading standard instead of the Twombly-Iqbal federal
74
pleading standard. And, of course, a state would also apply its pleading
standards to a state claim brought by a plaintiff against a diverse
75
defendant. But in either case, the state court likely will never have the
opportunity to apply its more lenient pleading standard. Defendants,
76
already prone to removal, will favor federal court even more strongly if
the federal pleading standard is stricter than the state standard of the
73
There are exceptions. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (2006) (imposing a
heightened federal pleading standard for federal securities fraud claims).
74
There is some uncertainty here. Federal pleading standards may control even
in state court if stricter state pleading standards would impose unnecessary burdens
on federal rights. See Brown v. W. Ry. of Ala., 338 U.S. 294, 298 (1949). But the
Supreme Court has never said that principles of preemption or reverse-Erie apply to
displace more lenient state pleading standards with stricter, non-statutory federal
pleading standards. But see Z.W. Julius Chen, Note, Following the Leader: Twombly,
Pleading Standards, and Procedural Uniformity, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1431, 1452–53 (2008)
(making the argument). For more on reverse-Erie, see generally Kevin M. Clermont,
Reverse-Erie, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2006).
75
In contrast with federal control of federal rights or federal procedure, federal
control of state procedure involving state rights is far more limited. See generally
Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Federal Regulation of State Court Procedures, 110 YALE L.J. 947
(2001). There are a few exceptions but none apply to pleading standards. See, e.g.,
Jinks v. Richland County, 538 U.S. 456 (2003) (upholding 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) which
imposes a federal tolling rule for state statutes of limitations).
76
See Kevin M. Clermont, Litigation Realities Redux, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1919,
1921–26 (2009).
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77

state court in which the case is filed. Removal can be accomplished
almost immediately, followed quickly by a motion to dismiss in federal
court under the stricter federal standard. Thus, for plaintiffs confronted
with Twombly and Iqbal, filing a removable case in state court is not a
78
comforting option.
State law harbors another option for these plaintiffs, however. Like
79
federal court, most states allow at least some presuit discovery. Many
80
state rules mirror federal Rule 27 and are similarly restrictive. Others
allow presuit discovery only to ascertain the identity of potential
defendants in certain cases and not to determine facts necessary to state a
81
claim. But several states allow presuit investigative discovery for the
82
purposes of filing a sufficient complaint. Plaintiffs who otherwise might
be trapped in federal court with information asymmetry can use these
procedures as a way to rectify that asymmetry before getting to federal
83
court. In the next few subparts, I explain how and evaluate the utility of
those state presuit discovery mechanisms.
1. State Presuit Discovery Mechanisms
Texas is perhaps the strongest proponent of presuit discovery for
purposes of framing a complaint. It allows presuit discovery whenever
justice or some other benefit outweighs the burden and expense of the
84
discovery requested. The Texas presuit discovery procedure is routinely
85
used to assist plaintiffs in drafting their complaints.
Alabama, like Texas, has a strong policy favoring presuit discovery
for claim investigation. Rule 27 of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure
allows pre-action discovery for “[a] person who desires to perpetuate
[his] own testimony or that of another person or to obtain discovery
under Rule 34 or Rule 35 regarding any matter that may be cognizable in

77
See Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 4 (manuscript at 13 n.40) (arguing that the
disparity between liberal state pleading and federal plausibility pleading will incent
defendants to remove).
78
Plaintiffs who sue diverse defendants on state law claims in the courts of the
state of a defendant’s residence can avoid this result because such a case is not
removable. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b). But, like the plaintiff who sues a non-diverse
defendant, because such a case is not removable, the plaintiff never had to fear the
federal Twombly-Iqbal standard in the first place.
79
Hoffman, supra note 8, at 225.
80
See id. at 235–36; Jeffrey J. Kroll, The Art and Science of Presuit Discovery, 45 TRIAL
Mar. 2009, at 28, 29.
81
See Hoffman, supra note 8, at 238; Kroll, supra note 80, at 29–30.
82
See infra Part IV.B.1.
83
Professor Lonny Hoffman has urged state law claimants faced with state
pleading hurdles and information asymmetry to use state presuit discovery
mechanisms more liberally. See Hoffman, supra note 56, at 31. He focuses on pleading
in state court; I focus here on pleading in federal court.
84
TEX. R. CIV. P. 202.1, 202.4.
85
Hoffman, supra note 8, at 253–54 (estimating that Texas presuit discovery has
been used approximately 4,000 times from 1999–2005 and that over 50% of the time
the rule was used, it was for presuit discovery).
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86

any court of this state.” The Alabama Supreme Court has construed the
rule to allow pre-action discovery “regardless of any need to perpetuate
evidence” if the plaintiff wishes to use it to determine whether she has a
87
reasonable basis for filing a lawsuit.
Other states are less overt about the availability of presuit discovery
but nonetheless do recognize it. New York statute provides: “Before an
action is commenced, disclosure to aid in bringing an action . . . may be
88
obtained, but only by court order.” To be entitled to this presuit
discovery, the applicant must make a prima facie showing that a cause of
89
action exists. But that does not mean that the applicant must already be
able to plead the cause of action; to the contrary, the application will be
denied if the applicant already has sufficient information upon which to
90
frame a complaint. Thus, New York law allows presuit discovery where
91
necessary to plead a claim.
Similarly, Ohio allows a petitioner to bring an action for discovery
when she is otherwise unable to file a complaint without the discovery.
Rule 34(D)(1) of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “a
person who claims to have a potential cause of action may file a petition
92
to obtain discovery as provided in this rule.” Under this rule, an action
93
for discovery may be used “to uncover facts necessary for pleading,”
including facts that would allow a plaintiff to determine if she has a valid
94
cause of action against a known defendant. “[T]he rule acts as a
safeguard against charges that the plaintiff filed a frivolous lawsuit in a
case where the wrongdoer or a third party has the ability to hide the facts
needed by the plaintiff to determine who is the wrongdoer and exactly
95
what wrong occurred.”
Pennsylvania also allows presuit discovery for purposes of composing
a complaint. The Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure allow a plaintiff
to “obtain pre-complaint discovery where the information sought is
material and necessary to the filing of the complaint and the discovery

86

ALA. R. CIV. P. 27.
Ex parte Anderson, 644 So. 2d 961, 964 (Ala. 1994); see also Driskill v. Culliver,
797 So. 2d 495, 497–98 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001) (allowing pre-action discovery “to
determine whether the plaintiff has a reasonable basis for filing an action”).
88
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3102(c) (McKinneys 2005).
89
Holzman v. Manhattan & Bronx Surface Transit Operating Auth., 707 N.Y.S.2d
159, 161 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000).
90
In re Henry, 843 N.Y.S.2d 891, 892 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007); W. Inv. L.L.C. v.
Georgeson S’holder Sec. Corp., 841 N.Y.S.2d 40, 41 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007).
91
New York courts have not been entirely clear in explaining what a “prima
facie” case is, but because they hold that plaintiffs with sufficient evidence to plead a
claim are not entitled to presuit discovery, the prima facie threshold must be fairly
minimal. For a more skeptical view, see Hoffman, supra note 8, at 237–38.
92
OHIO CIV. R. 34(D)(1).
93
Huge v. Ford Motor Co., 803 N.E.2d 859, 861 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004).
94
Benner v. Walker Ambulance Co., 692 N.E.2d 1053, 1055 (Ohio Ct. App.
1997).
95
Id.
87
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will not cause unreasonable annoyance, embarrassment, oppression,
96
burden or expense to any person or party.” Upon a defendant’s
objection, the court can require the plaintiff to “state with particularity
how the discovery will materially advance the preparation of the
97
complaint.”
Other states besides those I mention above, such as Vermont, appear
to have statutes or rules allowing presuit discovery to be used in the way I
98
suggest, though the case law is too sparse to conclude that definitively.
In addition to statutory or rule-based authorizations for presuit
99
discovery, most states—though not all —allow equitable bills of
discovery. Equitable bills of discovery were the primary mechanism to
obtain discoverable information in civil cases prior to the adoption of the
100
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and their state analogues. The
common law courts provided no mechanism for discovery at all, and, to
ameliorate that result, equity courts created the bill as an exercise of
101
Although modern
ancillary jurisdiction in aid of actions at law.
discovery rules in state and federal courts and the merger of law and
equity have largely replaced the need for equitable bills of discovery, the
102
majority of states still allow the bill. Courts generally have restricted the
bill to instances in which discovery cannot otherwise be had under the
applicable rules and statutes, and where discovery is necessary to secure
103
justice in the underlying proceeding. Thus, most states that do not have
a statute or rule allowing for presuit discovery to frame a complaint allow
104
an equitable action for a bill of discovery instead.

96

PA. R. CIV. P. 4003.8(a).
PA. R. CIV. P. 4003.8(b).
See, e.g., VT. R. CIV. P. 27 (reporter’s notes following rule stating that Vermont’s
“Rule 27(a)(1) provides for a verified petition for perpetuation of testimony or other
appropriate discovery before action” (emphasis added)); In re Burlington Bagel Bakery,
Inc., 549 A.2d 1044, 1045 (Vt. 1988) (representing the only case interpreting
Vermont’s rule and stating that the rule “gives the presiding judge discretion to grant
a petition for preaction discovery if he or she ‘is satisfied that the perpetuation of the
testimony or other discovery may prevent a failure or delay of justice’” (emphasis
added)).
99
See, e.g., Austin v. Johnston Coca-Cola Bottling Group, Inc., 891 P.2d 1143,
1146 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that Kansas does not recognize the equitable bill
of discovery).
100
Rupert F. Barron, Annotation, Existence and Nature of Cause of Action for
Equitable Bill of Discovery, 37 A.L.R.5TH 645, 658–59 (1996).
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Federal courts are decidedly more mixed about the availability of the
equitable bill of discovery in federal court after the advent of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, which provide ample discovery opportunities. See id. Still, at least one
court since the 1991 amendments to Rules 34 and 45 continues to recognize the
availability of the bill. See Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of Am. v. Energy Gathering, Inc., 2
F.3d 1397, 1408 (5th Cir. 1993).
97
98
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Connecticut, for example, recognizes an independent equitable
105
action for a bill of discovery. The bill is designed to obtain evidence for
106
use in an action for affirmative relief. Because “a pure bill of discovery
is favored in equity, it should be granted unless there is some well
107
founded objection against the exercise of the court’s discretion.” To
sustain the bill, the petitioner must demonstrate that what she seeks to
discover is material and is necessary to prove, or is needed to aid in
proving or in defending, another action already brought or about to be
brought. The petitioner must show that he has no other adequate means
of enforcing discovery of the desired material, where “adequate” takes
108
into consideration convenient, effective, and full relief.
2. Minor Limitations
As the foregoing Part demonstrates, many states allow presuit
discovery to obtain information that may be critical to surviving a
Twombly-Iqbal motion to dismiss. To be granted, however, the plaintiff
must overcome several potential limitations on the viability of the use of
these state presuit discovery mechanisms. Each of these limitations is
likely to be minor or easy to overcome.
First, the plaintiff may worry that the defendant will remove to
federal court her state petition for presuit discovery or independent
action for an equitable bill of discovery, and that the federal court will
then be reluctant to allow the discovery in the face of Twombly and Iqbal.
A defendant may argue for removal based on diversity of the parties to
the discovery action or, perhaps, based on any federal question presented
by the underlying substantive cause of action. But removal probably is
not available in these cases. Indeed, courts usually refuse to allow removal
109
of presuit discovery petitions. They reason that presuit discovery is not
110
a civil action within the meaning of the removal statute. This view is
likely correct, for presuit discovery is a procedural device rather than a
cause of action for substantive relief. Courts have also held that
111
independent actions for equitable bills of discovery are not removable,
105

Berger v. Cuomo, 644 A.2d 333, 337 (Conn. 1994).
Id.
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2006) (restricting removal to “civil action[s]”).
110
See Young v. Hyundai Motor Mfg. Ala., LLC, 575 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1254 (M.D.
Ala. 2008) (citing cases following the majority rule); McCrary v. Kansas City S. R.R.,
121 F. Supp. 2d 566, 569 (E.D. Tex. 2000) (holding that Texas Rule 202 does not
initiate a civil action within the meaning of the removal statute because it asserts no
claim or cause of action upon which relief could be granted); In re Hinote, 179 F.R.D.
335, 336 (S.D. Ala. 1998) (holding that Alabama Rule 27 is a request for discovery,
not a civil action within the meaning of the federal removal statute). But see In re
Texas, 110 F. Supp. 2d 514, 522–23 (E.D. Tex. 2000) (finding a petition for presuit
discovery is a civil action under the removal statutes), rev’d on other grounds, sub nom.
Texas v. Real Parties in Interest, 259 F.3d 387, 395 (5th Cir. 2001).
111
See Wilson v. Belin, 20 F.3d 644, 651 n.8 (5th Cir. 1994) (suggesting that an
equitable bill of discovery is not removable); Young, 575 F. Supp. 2d at 1255 (same).
106
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though as an independent cause of action, that seems less certain.
Nevertheless, removal would still be unavailable if the parties are not
diverse (or, even if the parties are diverse, if the defendant is a citizen of
112
the forum state), or if the amount in controversy is not met (likely to
113
fail, given that the relief sought is merely equitable discovery ). Finally,
the Supreme Court has held that the All Writs Act is generally
unavailable to allow removal of otherwise non-removable actions that
114
threaten to interfere with federal proceedings. All told, removal to a
hostile federal forum is unlikely.
Second, the plaintiff may worry that a state court will not permit
presuit discovery if her claim is a federal claim. No presuit discovery
mechanism I am aware of so limits presuit discovery. A few mechanisms,
such as Alabama’s rule, limit presuit discovery to causes of action that can
115
be heard in the courts of that state, but state courts generally can hear
federal causes of action, including civil rights claims under § 1983 and
federal antidiscrimination claims. It is true that a select few causes of
action provide for exclusive federal jurisdiction—federal antitrust and
116
But states generally
securities fraud claims are prime examples.
recognize analogous causes of action—say, breach of fiduciary duties,
unfair competition, or even state antitrust claims—that should cover
sufficiently similar allegations such that the presuit discovery mechanism
would allow discovery of facts needed to plead the federal cause of
action.
Third, the costs of presuit discovery may be prohibitive. Plaintiffs
truly confronted with information asymmetry may face a substantial ex
ante uncertainty about the merit of their claims. The cost of presuit
discovery may outweigh the possibility and benefit of a meritorious claim,
but this does not seem very likely. Most states, even Texas, limit presuit
discovery far more than the full discovery parties employ after the filing
117
of a formal lawsuit. Plaintiffs deterred by the limited costs of presuit
discovery ought to be even more deterred from filing a formal lawsuit. If
anything, the limited cost of presuit discovery ought to benefit plaintiffs
overall, for those plaintiffs deterred by the cost of a formal lawsuit may be
able to use the presuit discovery mechanism to buy, relatively cheaply, a
But see Hernandez Perez v. Citibank, N.A., 328 F. Supp. 2d 1374, 1379 (S.D. Fla. 2004)
(holding an equitable bill of discovery under Florida law to be removable under the
Edge Act).
112
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)–(b).
113
See, e.g., Stoller v. Nissan Motor Corp., 934 F. Supp. 423, 424 (S.D. Fla. 1996)
(remanding a removed equitable bill of discovery for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction because the amount in controversy requirement was not met).
114
See Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 34 (2002).
115
ALA. R. CIV. P. 27 (“A person who desires to . . . obtain discovery under Rule
34 or Rule 35 regarding any matter that may be cognizable in any court of this state may file a
verified petition . . . .” (emphasis added)).
116
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 4 (2006); Clayton (Antitrust) Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a)
(2006); Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77v (2006).
117
Hoffman, supra note 8, at 225–26.
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free look at the merits of the case. On balance, the cost limitations of
presuit discovery are minimal and, compared to the alternative of full
discovery, probably amount to a net cost benefit.
Fourth, there may be equitable objections if defendants cannot
access state presuit discovery mechanisms for their compulsory
118
counterclaims. Conceivably, the catch-22 of federal pleading could
119
apply to defendants with counterclaims just as it does to plaintiffs. This
inequity is less stark if, as in most cases relevant to this Article, the
defendant is the one invoking the federal forum by removing the case. In
addition, a defendant with a compulsory counterclaim can always sue
first, in effect turning the tables on the other party. And, there may still
be opportunities for a defendant to take advantage of equitable bills of
120
discovery in state court while the federal case is pending.
3. Major Limitations
There are, however, several major limitations on the use of state
presuit discovery mechanisms to cure the federal pleadings catch-22.
State court authority over presuit actions is cabined by federal due
process considerations and may be, additionally, by state venue rules and
state long-arm statutes. Thus, a plaintiff may find herself confined to one
of the states that recognizes neither presuit investigative discovery nor
equitable bills of discovery.
In addition, some states’ mechanisms may not allow presuit discovery
121
For example, some states that recognize
in particular instances.
equitable bills of discovery do so only after a plaintiff has filed a lawsuit
122
on the substantive claim, and it is unclear whether the bill would be
allowed if the claim is before a federal, as opposed to a state, court. I have
not found a case in which a state court has allowed an equitable bill of
discovery ancillary to a federal case. The dearth of opinions suggests that
such a split proceeding is not likely to be allowed. However, one court
that has denied a bill of discovery based on ancillary proceedings in
federal court, did so only on the grounds that the federal court provided
123
an adequate opportunity for the discovery requested. In other words,

118

I thank Professor Michael Steven Green for raising this point.
Twombly and Iqbal, as constructions of Rule 8(a), surely apply to
counterclaims, though they probably do not apply to defenses, which are governed by
Rules 8(b) and (c). FED. R. CIV. P. 8.
120
See infra text accompanying notes 123–124.
121
In addition, it is possible that the use of state presuit discovery mechanisms to
survive federal pleading standards, a role for which they likely were not intended, will
engender significant pushback among state courts and legislatures, ultimately
resulting in a restriction on their utility. My thanks to Professor Lonny Hoffman for
raising this point.
122
Barron, supra note 100, at 670.
123
See Trak Microwave Corp. v. Culley, 728 So. 2d 1177 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)
(per curiam). Analogous situations of underlying proceedings in foreign jurisdictions
also depend not upon the separateness of the judicial systems but rather the
availability of discovery in the underlying case. See, e.g., Debt Settlement Adm’rs, LLC
119
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what doomed the bill was not that it was ancillary to a federal court—it
was that the federal court provided an adequate discovery mechanism.
Perhaps if the federal court had not provided an adequate opportunity
for discovery—because of, say, a high pleading standard—the equitable
124
bill would have issued. That outcome is very uncertain, however. If
discovery is not available, then plaintiffs will have to file solely in state
court and seek a bill of discovery prior to removal of the substantive
125
claim.
Similarly, asymmetry between state and federal pleading standards
may undermine a plaintiff’s attempt to justify state presuit discovery. In
other words, a plaintiff who makes the case for presuit discovery based
126
upon the notice pleading standards of, for example, Ohio, may be
limited by the court to discovering only enough facts to plead her case
under that liberal standard, preventing her from obtaining other facts
that she might need to survive the stricter Twombly-Iqbal federal standard.
Or, perhaps more likely, she has sufficient information to bring a case
under that notice pleading standard already and will be denied the
opportunity to use the presuit discovery mechanism to obtain additional
127
discovery needed to meet the federal standard. This problem may
indeed reduce the utility of using the presuit discovery mechanisms of
notice pleading states whose mechanism does not extend to plaintiffs
who are able to file a state complaint without presuit discovery. In
relation, plaintiffs may resist filing presuit discovery for fear that their
allegations of inability to plead a cause of action will be used against
128
them later.
v. Antigua & Barbuda, 950 So. 2d 464, 465 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (foreign
proceeding). Indeed, in one foreign case, the fact that the foreign case had been
reduced to a judgment and was no longer open to discovery was used by the court to
allow a state equitable bill of discovery. See Otto’s Heirs v. Kramer, 797 So. 2d 594,
596–97 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
124
One might question how this would work in practice, particularly if the
federal court would be likely to dismiss the federal case under Rule 12(b)(6) prior to
the completion of discovery in state court. One simple way to avoid the logistical
timing issues would be for the federal court to dismiss only on the condition that an
amended complaint is not filed within a certain period of time, with that period
being long enough for the state discovery to be completed.
125
This may not be as time-sensitive as it initially sounds, at least for certain cases.
Removal must take place in thirty days, but that clock only begins to run from the
time that the action first becomes removable. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2006). Thus, a
plaintiff who asserts a non-removable claim initially may simultaneously seek an
equitable bill of discovery and then, after obtaining the information, add the
removable claim.
126
OHIO CIV. R. 8(A); Fancher v. Fancher, 455 N.E.2d 1344, 1347–48 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1982) (confirming that Ohio is a notice pleading state).
127
On the other hand, the pleading asymmetry may work in favor of presuit
discovery. A notice pleading state whose presuit discovery mechanism can be used
only to supplement a sufficient pleading with additional facts may provide the
plaintiff with access to presuit discovery because she met the state notice pleading
standard, even if her fear is a failure to meet the stricter federal pleading standard.
128
See Hoffman, supra note 56, at 31.
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Finally, limitations periods may curtail the utility of presuit discovery.
Most states provide that presuit discovery tolls the limitations period for
129
filing the underlying state causes of action in state court. Federal courts
hearing state causes of action on diversity generally would credit that
130
state rule, but federal courts hearing federal causes of action may not.
It may be that federal courts would allow the tolling as a matter of federal
law, but that is unclear. The resulting uncertainty in the face of an easy
limitations defense may discourage the use of presuit discovery if it would
either cause a claim to be filed outside its limitations period or if it could
not be completed before the limitations period expired.
V. CONCLUSION
The use of state presuit discovery mechanisms has promise as a way
to avoid the catch-22 of federal pleading standards. In cases in which they
are applicable, state presuit discovery mechanisms ought to be used more
robustly by plaintiffs who fear that their complaints would otherwise be
dismissed under the federal plausibility pleading standard.
But state presuit discovery is not a panacea. It has significant
limitations for use in federal pleading. For those who believe presuit
discovery ought to be available to soften Twombly and Iqbal, amending
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 27 or providing for presuit discovery by
statute may be the best way to achieve that goal and to avoid the
limitations that state presuit discovery entails. The rulemaking and
statutory processes have their downsides. They can be cumbersome, and
a rule proposal would have to win the blessings of a Court that is highly
skeptical of current tools to control discovery costs.
If one of these routes is taken however, state presuit discovery may
serve an additional role as a model for federal reform. Perhaps it could
be used to propose a Rule 27 amendment or federal presuit discovery
statute that not only would alleviate the information asymmetry problems
created by Twombly and Iqbal but also would be focused enough to
assuage concerns about high discovery costs. I leave for another day just
what such a proposal would look like.

129

Hoffman, supra note 8, at 266–67.
Federal courts generally must apply both the state statute of limitations, see
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 110 (1945), and state tolling principles, see
Ragan v. Merchs. Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 533 (1949).
130

